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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Defendant-Appellant,
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION and
J. DEAN GERSTNER,
Defendants-Respondents,
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Plaintif!-Appellant,
vs.
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION and
J. DEAN GERSTNER,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12118

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
S'rATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is a consolidation of three lawsuits involving the rights and obligations of Vulcan Steel Corporation
and its two shareholders J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 29, 1970, the Third Judicial District Court
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entire time and efforts to the affairs of the Corporation for
a period of five years (R. 170).
A clause, subparagraph 3 (c) in the Agreement provided for mandatory repurchase of stock by the Corporation in the event of "termination of employment by Corporalio11", which reads as follows (R. 172):
"(c)

Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock Offered.

At the termination of the employment by Corporation of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, it
shall be mandatory for Corporation to purchase all
of the stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any stockholder or transferee giving written notice as herein
provided of his or her intention to dispose of his or
her stock ... "
In early January, 1968, Markosian decided to leave
Vulcan Steel Corporation and to organize another steel company in competition with Vulcan (R. 142). Thereafter, he
and without notice to Vulcan deposited to Vulcan's
account the sum of $20,000.00, constituting the outstanding
balance of his subscription obligation which he had previously refused to pay (R. 142). After this action Markosian
formally terminated his employment with Vulcan Steel Corporation on January 23rd, 1968, and demanded that the
Corporation repurchase the shares of stock owned by him
in the Corporation pursuant to subparagraph 3 ( c). The
repurchase price under this clause contained a formula increasing depreciated value to fair market value and a payment for good will evaluated at 21/2 times the average
profits for the previous five years (R. 172).
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in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered an
order granting respondent Vulcan Steel a partial Summary
Judgment thereby permitting liqmdation and dissolution of
the Corporation in lieu of mandatory repurchase of the
stock of Markosian by Vulcan.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to affirm the lower court's Order of
Partial Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts made by appellant is substantially correct but fails to include certain facts significant
to this interlocutory appeal.
In the spring of 1965, J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian commenced negotiations to organize a steel fabricating business utilizing a steel plant, machinery, equipment and steel inventories owned by several Gerstner family corporations. On April 12, 1965, Markosian and Gerstner
executed an Agreement finalizing their negotiations wherein Gerstner received 51 % of the stock of the Corporation
and Markosian subscribed to 49% of the stock. Markosian
paid for half of his stock within a short period of its due
date, but failed to pay the final $20,000.00 on April 1, 1966
as required by the Agreement.
The Agreement provided that Gerstner would be president and treasurer of the Corporation and that Markosian
would be vice president, general manager and secretary (R.
169). The Agreement also required Markosian to devote his
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business. In that connection, we again wish to repeat our demand that an independent certified public accountant audit the accounts and records of the
Corporation so that the assets and liabilities of the
Corporation will be properly stated in the event of
a redemption pursuant the terms of said Agreement
or a liquidation because of Mr. Gerstner also giving
notice of his desire to have the parties vote their
stock for liquidation and dissolution of the Corvoration. This independent audit should enable the parties to agree upon the assets and liabilities of the
Corporation without further legal action." (Exhibit
A, Emphasis added.)
Vulcan agreed to have such an audit performed provided
both parties would mutually share in the expense of such
an audit. Markosian refused and Vulcan proceeded with
the preparation of the accounting documents by a former
accountant for the firm.
Immediately after such notice, litigation was commenced by Vulcan, Gerstner and Markosian in three separate actions involving many complex issues of alleged
wrongdoings by both parties. The actions were consolidated. Markosian moved for partial summary judgment to
interpret the mandatory repurchase provision of subparagraph 3 ( c) which was granted by the lower court. On
appeal, this Court, in its 3-2 decision, held the repurchase
provisions applicable even when termination of employment
was voluntary.
Within 30 days after the Supreme Court's decision,
Vulcan served notice on Markosian of its intention to invoke the alternate provisions of subparagraph 3 (e) pro-
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Vulcan attempted to return to Markosian his untimely
subscription payment of $20,000.00 but this was refused.
Concurrent with this action, Vulcan notified Markosiau
that it would not repurchase the shares of stock owned by
Markosian in the Corporation contending that the mandatory repurchase provision of subparagraph 3 ( c) contemplated repurchase only when the termination of the employment was by the Corporation and not a voluntary termination. At that time, Vulcan also advised Markosian that
in the event the Court determined that subparagraph 3 (c)
required repurchase by the Corporation of Markosian's
stock, Vulcan would invoke the alternate provisions of subparagraph 3 ( e), "Dual Notice", providing for liquidation
and dissolution of the Corporation:
" ( e)

Dual Notice.

In the event both Markosian and Gerstner wish to
terminate their employment by Corporation and desire to have Corporation purchase their stock, the
parties hereto agree to vote their stock for liquidation and dissolution of Corporation."
Within three weeks after Markosian's voluntary termination, an attorney representing Markosian acknowledged
that Vulcan had indicated its intention to liquidate the corporation in the event the Court determined the mandatory
repurchase provisions applicable. In his letter of February
13, 1968 Mr. Markosian's attorney stated as follows (R.
299) :

"You have indicated that Mr. Gerstner is cunsidering liquidation of the Corporation pursuant to the
provisions of the Agreement entered into by Mr.
Markosian and Mr. Gerstner at the inception of this
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(]Uiesced if not elected to have the Corporation dissolved
unde1· the "Dual Notice" provision of the contract.
The final Order signed by the Court granting Markosian's Motion for the appointment of a Receiver did so
pursuant to Rule 66 (h) o fthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which authorizes the appointment of a Receiver for
liquidation of the Corporation (R. 338). Vulcan then moved
the Court for partial summary judgment to liquidate and
dissolve the Corporation in accordance with subparagraph
:3 ( e) ··Dual Notice" in lieu of the mandatory repurchase
provisio11s of subparagraph 3 ( c) (R. 333). The Court, in
its Order granting respondent Vulcan's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, ordered the liquidation and dissolution
of the Corporation in lieu of the mandatory repurchase
provisions of the Agreement. From this order appellant
Markosian appeals. Respondents Vulcan Steel Corporation
and J. Dean Gerstner seek to have the Order of the lower
Court affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS PRIOR DECISION DID NOT CONSIDER OR HAVE BEFORE
IT THE ISSUE OF "DUAL NOTICE".
Appellant Markosian, in Point I of his brief, incorrectly argues that the lower Court's Order of April 29, 1970
providing for liquidation and dissolution disregards the
mandate of the Supreme Court. This Court in its opinion
<lid not comment upon alternate provisions of the Agree-
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viding for liquidation of the Corporntion (R. 299, Exhibit
"B"). It had repeatedly advised Markosian of this intended
action (Appellant's prior Brief, p. 13). Markosian responded by filing a Motion with the Court for the appointment of a Receiver for the Corporation (R. 291). Vulcan
also moved to amend its Complaint praying for liquidation
and dissolution of the Corporation in accordance with the
provisions of subparagraph 3 (e) (R. 296).
At the time of argument on the Motion for the appoint·
ment of the Receiver the attorneys for Markosian stipulated
that Vulcan's pleadings might be amended to rely upon the
provisions of subparagraph 3 ( e) without concurring that
Gerstner had the right to rely upon such a provision. At
the hearing, Markosian failed to establish any grounds for
the appointment of a Receiver contained in subparagraph
(a) of Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.
399). Vulcan resisted the appointment of a Receiver unless
the same were to be appointed in accordance with
subparagraph (h) of Rule 66 which provides for the appointment of a Receiver on dissolution and liquidation of
the corporation. This position was taken on the basis that
subparagraph 3 (e) of the Agreement providng for "Dual
Notice" concerning dissolution was consistent with such
action. The issue was clearly presented to Markosian to
either withdraw his motion for an appointment of a Receiver or to accept the appointment of a Receiver pursuant
to the provisions of '·Dual Notice" and dissolution of the
Corporation (R. 401). Markosian chose to continue to request the Court to appoint a Receiver and by so doing ac-
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Court limited its decision to the interpretation of subparagraph 8 ( c) of the Agreement and held that Markosian, as
a minority stockholder, would not be required to leave his
investment in a Corporation with which he was no longer
associated. Applying the provisions of subparagraph 3 (e)
of the Agreement entitled "Dual Notice", the same objective can be accomplished on a fair and equitable basis for
both parties and does not permit Markosian to profit from
his own wrongdoings.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ORDER OF APRIL 29,
1970 CORRECTLY INTERPRETS THE AGREE1\TENT.
Markosian, in his brief on pages 6, 7 acknowledges
that Gerstner and Vulcan have consistently, during the interlocutory appeals and at the time of the voluntary initial
termination of employment by Markosian, taken the position that the provisions of subparagraph 3 (e) providing
for "Dual Notice" may be invoked if the Supreme Court
construed the Agreement to require the Corporation to repurchase Markosian's stock. This position was acknowledged in the letter of Markosian's counsel dated February
U, 1968 (R. 299); stated in Vulcan's first petition for intermediate appeal (R. 213); in the memorandum supporting the petition for interlocutory appeal (R. 222); and in
Appellant's Brief in the prior appeal (Appellant's Brief,
p. 13).
Within 30 days after the Supreme Court interpreted

ment, and this point is in direct conflict with the argument
by Markosian at the time of that prior hearing. In the prior
appeal, l\Iarkosian stated the issues before the Court in his
brief as follows (Respondent's Brief, pp. 1-2):
"The sole issue i-aised by Vulcan's appeal from the
District court's Order of partial summary judgment
dated February 24, 1969, is whether the district
court was correct in ruling that the agreement of
April 12, 1965, imposed upon Vulcan a duty to redeem Mr. Markosian's shares of the capital stock of
Vulcan."
It is clear from the foregoing as well as the entire de-

cision of the Supreme Court in its 3-2 decision that the sole
issue before the Court was the interpretation of subparagraph 3 (c) of the Agreement and that this Court merely
upheld the trial court's ruling that as a matter of law subparagraph 3 ( c) of the subject Agreement provided that
Markosian could have his stock repurchased even though
he voluntarily terminated his employment with the Company. This Court, in its decision, initially stated:

"The sole issue before this Court is whether the
trial court properly interpreted subparagraph 3 (c)
of an Agreement between J. Dean Gerstner and
Abraham Markosian, which was adopted and ratified by Vulcan Steel Corporation." (Emphasis
added.) (R. 28f>, 23 Utah 2d 287, 462 P. 2d 166.)
The issue of "Dual Notice" now before the Court was
not an issue in the prior appeal although Markosian was
put on ample notice that this action would be ultimately
taken in the event the Court determined Vulcan had not
correctly interpreted subparagraph 3 ( c). The Supreme
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that assel'tion, but if such is true Markosian must accept
his share of responsibility therefor. Not only did Markosian
breach his managerial contract when he terminated his
employment after less than 3 years of a 5 year contract,
but he also went into competition against Vulcan Steel, bid
contracts to former customers of Vulcan, hired away employees of Vulcan and removed dies from Vulcan's plant.
This conduct should not be rewarded by permitting him to
now force the Corporation to repurchase his stock at a
premium by paying for goodwill computed at 21;2 times the
yearly average profits; and, if the Corporation is not in a
position to make such redemption then to require Gerstner,
the majority stockholder, to personally pay the higher premium to this defaulting party, as asserted in Markosian's
brief now before the Court (See Appellant's Brief, p. 10
and 11). The dissolution of the corporation, as sought by
Markosian in requesting the Court to have a Receiver appointed, permits both of the participants to receive their
proportionate share of the assets of the Company as provided for in subparagraph 3 (e) entitled "Dual Notice".
Issues have been raised by the pleadings concerning the
wrongdoing of both parties so that when this case is finally
tried, the Court can determine the culpability of the respective parties and make any adjustment in the distribution
necessitated by such findings. If a trial on the merits establishes that Gerstner has wrongfully lost profits and depleted corporate assets after Markosian's voluntary termination, Gerstner will be required to respond for his actions in damages. If, on the other hand, the trial court
finds that the Corporation lost profits and had its capital
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subparagraph 3 ( c), Vulcan and Gerstner served formal
written notice on Markosian of their intention to invoke
the provisions of subparagraph 3 (e) for liquidation and
dissolution of the Corporation (R. 299, Exhibit "B"). Vulcan and Gerstner did not exercise clause 3 (e) at the time
of Markosian's voluntary termination because they justifiably believed Markosian had no rights under the mandatory repurchase provisions since his termination of employment was voluntary. Such belief was not unreasonable nor
unfounded since two members of this Court upheld such
position in their dissenting opinion. Nevertheless, Markosian was put on notice that liquidation and dissolution
would be considered if the Court so held. In his brief,
Gerstner stated:
"If the present interpretation of the Agreement is
sustained requiring a mandatory repurchase of Mar·
kosian stock at a premium, thus permitting the respondent to profit from his own wrong, Gerstner
hereby serves notice that he may be required to invoke the provisions of subparagraph 3 (e) requiring a liquidation and dissolution of the corporation
and distribution to the parties of their respective
interests. Such undesirable procedure would at least
permit both of the parties to be treated on the same
basis and receive such value as rightfully belongs to
both parties rather than permitting a wrongdoer to
receive a premium at the expense of the innocent remaining party."
Markosian contends that "Vulcan has changed from a
healthy prosperous going business (R. 310) into an emaciated entity in deep distress" and therefore liquidation and
dissolution is untimely and inequitable. Not agreeing with
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depleted as a result of Markosian's wrongful actions and
breach of his employment contract, he will be required to
respond in damages. These remedies are available against
both parties individually, irrespective of liquidation and
dissolution of the Corporation. Therefore, the allegation
that the capital of the Corporation has been depleted has
no relevance to whether the Court should permit liquidation
and dissolution of the Corporation since remedies for that
allegation will survive this interlocutory appeal and await
trial. On the other hand, if this Order is reversed and the
Corporation is liquidated under the receivership initiated
by Markosian, Vulcan and Gerstner would be required to
repurchase the stock of Markosian at a premium without
being able to recoup such expenditures from a going busi·
ness. Markosian should not have the right to put Vulcan
out of business at the same time being paid on the basis of
a going business, i.e., payment for good will and appreciated
assets.
It should be noted at this juncture that Markosian, in

the prior appeal on mandatory repurchase, drew the Court's
attention to the danger of a minority shareholder being
"locked in" a closed corporation. The true intent of Markosian can be now more clearly demonstrated when he
secretly deposited to the account of the Corporation the
balance of his overdue subscription obligation of $20,000.00
and at the same time demanded repurchase with a premium
by the Corporation. His motives could not be those of one
who, as a minority shareholder was "locked in" to a closed
corporation. Rather, the motives were those of one seeking

.-,
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to cnJOY a profit at the expense of Vulcan and Gerstner.
Om couits :::;hould not be a party to such practices by conduning such conduct and permitting a defaulting party to
profit the1·efrom. The order of liquidation and dissolution
in ac':orclance with subparagraph 3 (e) of the Agreement
''ill gumt to Markosian the remedy he sought in the prior
appeal in that he will no longer be "locked in" but will
share in the liquidated assets of the Corporation. The determination of the trial court that "Dual Notice" is an
available alternate remedy is not inconsistent with the prior
Supreme Court decision and is best calculated to equitably
<lisassociate the parties.
POINT III.
MARKOSIAN, NOT GERSTNER, IS BARRED
BY HIS OWN CONDUCT FROM THE POSITION HE NOW ASSERTS.
On Fehruary 19, 1970, Markosian moved the Court for
the appointment of a Receiver after Vulcan and Gerstner
had served notice of their intent to liquidate and dissolve
the Corporation. At the time of the argument on the Motion for the appointment of a Receiver, Markosian failed
to establish a sufficient hasis for the appointment of a Rereiver under Rule 66 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Vulcan resisted the appointment of a
Receive1· unless the same were to be appointed pursuant to
the provisions of subparagraph (h) of Rule 66, which provides for the appointment of a Receiver to liquidate a corporation. Markosian was then faced with the issue of
whether to continue to urge the Court to appoint a Receiver

14

under such conditions or to withdraw the request for the
appointirn::nt of a Receiver. This was made clear to counsel
for Markosian as follows:
MR. BUSHNELL:
" . . . and now by their Motion to have a Receiver
appointed to conserve and terminate their existing
business. It seems to me their very actions are making an election. I will proceed regardless of their
statement of position and state \Ve will join in the
appointment of a Receiver, but as we review the
code it appears the only basis on which the Court
has authority to appoint such a receiver is Rule 66,
Subparagraph (h) - Appointment of Receiver on
Dissolution of Corporation. You tell me if you're
relying on any other provision of law, Mr. Patton.
On page 746 Subparagraph (a) 5 - Grounds for
Appointment. 'A receiver may be appointed by the
Court in which an action is pending or has passed
to judgment; in cases where a corporation has been
dissolved or is insolvent or imminent danger of insolvency or has forfeited its corporate rights.' We
submit the document he has now submitted shows
this company has not been insolvent. It's not in an
insolvent position. That one does not apply. On that
basis and pursuant to that authority we would join
that Motion for the Appointment of a Receiver, but
provide further in the prayer that the receiver only
be permitted to do the things as executed in their
Motion. The order would have to be enlarged to let
the receiver have authority to sell and liquidate the
physical assets. Vulcan is under a lease which expires this month. Certain expensive equipment re·
quires monthly payment, funds were necessary to
be procured. I think it would be appropriate for
both Markosian and Gerstner to make a bid to the

15
receive1· to acquire these assets, and then let the
receiver proceed thereafter to do the things that
have been suggested by Mr. Patton ... " (R. 399).

*
MR. PATTON:

*

*

*

*

*

··. . . One other thing I would like to say with regards to the Motion of Appointment of a Receiver.
1 would think my client would be perfectly happy to
have a receiver appointed to wind up the business
and all the rest of this, and hold whatever funds
may be left pending a determination of this question
of law whether or not the dual notice provision applies or we 're entitled to redemption measured of
this earlier date of January 1968. And if we can
agree on that - parties can agree on that it will be
to everybody's benefit and, of course, primarily Mr.
Markosian's benefit. Whatever is left will be preserved, if he is in fact entitled to a judgment ... "
(R. 401).

*

*

*

*

*

*

THE COURT:
"In regard to the suggestion and recommendation
of Mr. Patton, the receiver be appointed with the
authority to proceed with the winding up and dissolution, reserving the other issue as to which procedure you're going to follow, the legal issues - any
objections to that?"

MR. BUSHNELL:
"We obpect to it. I don't think it's a matter the
Court can rule on. At this point we don't want to
be in the position of acquiescing or -"
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such action. The principle of estoppel now asserted by
iVIarkosian in his brief against Gerstner must apply against
him, thus preventing Markosian from repudiating an election to have a Receiver appointed to liquidate the Corporation.

Markosian erroneously argues that Gerstner and Vulcan are estopped from liquidation and dissolution in that
they previously exercised an election of remedies. Such is
not the case. The rule of election of remedies referred to
in 28 Corpus Juris Secundum, § 12, p. 1085 states to the
contrary:

"Where there is doubt as to right remedy. Where
the victim of a wrong has at his command inconsistent remedies and he is doubtful which is the
right one, in the absence of facts creating an equitable estoppel, he may pursue any or all of them until he recovers through one, since the prosecution
of a wrong remedy to defeat will estop him from
subsequently pursuing the right one. A party is not
required to select his procedure at his peril."
Also in 28 C. J. S., § 12, p. 1086 it is stated:
"Mistake as to legal effect of instrument. Where a
"Mistake as to legal effect of instrument. Where a
party prosecutes an action at law based upon a misapprehension to the legal effect of a written instrument, and dismisses the action, or where in such
case, on prosecution to judgment, it is defeated because of such error, such acts do not constitute an
election of remedies so as to preclude a subsequent
action to reform the instrument."
It is the general rule that an election can exist only
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MR. PATTON:
"I think the question of dual notice was properly in.
voked. I think that's the subject matter for Motion
on Summary Judgment - something probably akin
to that. It needs a little more explanation of the
facts.
THE COURT:
"Are you agreed it should be decided and wind it
up?"
MR. BUSHNELL:
"We're agreed to that" ( R. 403) .
Markosian elected to continue to urge the Court to
appoint a Receiver. The final Order signed by the Court
granting Markosian's Motion for the appointment of a Receiver did so pursuant to Rule 66 (h) which authorizes the
appointment of a Receiver for liquidation of the Corporation (R. 338). The Court subsequently heard and granted
a Motion of Vulcan and Gerstner for partial summary judgment to liquidate and dissolve the Corporation in accord·
ance with subparagraph 3 (e) "Dual Notice" (R. 333). It
is clear from the foregoing that the appointment of a Re·
ceiver pursuant to the Motion of Markosian was a part and
parcel of the Court's granting a Motion for partial sum·
mary judgment providing for liquidation of the Corpora·
tion pursuant to the provisions for "Dual Notice". Markosian, having initiated the Motion and having continued
to urge the Court to appoint a Receiver knowing that this
could only be accomplished pursuant to subparagraph (h)
of Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is now
estopped to contend that the Court was in error in taking

18

where there is a choice between two or more inconsistent
remedies actually existing at the time the election is made.
Hence the fact that a party misconceives his right or
through mistake attempts to exercise the right or remedy
to which he is not entitled or defends an action based upon
a remedial right which he erroneously supposes he has and
is defeated because of such enor does not constitute a conclusive election and does not preclude him from thereafter
pro,;ecuting an action based upon an inconsistent remedial
right. In the instant case, the refusal of Vulcan Steel to
honor the mandatory repurchase clause was not a choice
between two inconsistent remedies by Vulcan but only a
defense to Markosian's choice of remedies. In the initial
appeal, the Court made no determination that the rights
granted in the contract for unilateral redemption of stock
was mutually exclusive to the clause providing for "Dual
Notice" and dissolution. The Utah Supreme Court has
spoken on this subject in the case of Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 289 P. 2d 1045, 4
Utah 2d 155, wherein the Court held that the doctrine of
election of remedies applies as a bar only where two actions
are inconsistent, generally based upon incompatible facts
and the doctrine does not operate as an estoppel where two
or more remedies are given to redress the same wrong and
are consistent, in which event the satisfaction operates as
a bar.
Also, in the case of Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork
v. Spam.sh Fork South Irr. Co., 153 P. 2d 547, 107 Utah
279, the Court held that under the doctrine of "election of
remedies", the fact that a party by mistake invokes a rem·
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edy not available to him under the facts will not prevent

him from pursuing another remedy which is available.
Since the prior appeal was an interlocutory appeal
prior to trial, a different situation is presented than where
a party elects to try his case first on one theory and after
being defeated seeks to then assert a second theory and a
second trial. This case is still pending in the pleading stage
and has not been tried. Gerstner, therefore, should be permitted to allege any grounds of relief available to him so
that the case will be finally disposed of at the time of trial.
Under such facts, it is the general rule that the prior action
must have been prosecuted to a final determination in order
to bar another concurrent remedy for the same rights (28
C. J. S., § 15, p. 1091).

CONCLUSION
The trial court's interpretation permitting liquidation
and dissolution of the Corporation in lieu of the mandatory
repurchase provisions of the Agreement is in harmony with
the Agreement interpreted as a whole. In addition, it permits both of the parties to be treated on the same basis and
receive such value as rightfully belongs to both parties
rather than permitting a wrongdoer to have an advantageous and superior position over other parties to the contract and to profit from his own wrongdoing.
Respectfully submitted,

WILFORD A. BEESLEY
DAN S. BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Respondents

